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 Mass Asylum and Human Rights
 in American Foreign Policy
 JOHN A. SCANLAN
 G. D. LOESCHER
 From 1948, when the United States began admitting European
 displaced persons, until 1980, when the so-called Cuban freedom flotilla arrived
 in Florida, the standard method of admitting refugees to this country was first
 to screen them abroad and then to permit them entry according to their place on
 rank-order waiting lists. Although nearly 2 million aliens entered the United
 States in this manner, the political problems associated with large-scale refugee
 movements, and with applications from individuals fleeing repressive regimes
 diplomatically tied to the United States, were minimized. In this way, U.S. of-
 ficials could regulate the flow of refugees to avoid unacceptable levels of
 domestic backlash and to keep international embarrassments to a minimum. It
 was possible, in other words, to maintain without much difficulty a refugee ad-
 missions system almost entirely independent of U.S. immigration law, under the
 direct control of the executive rather than the legislative branch, and dedicated
 to a few consistent, but limited, foreign-policy ends.
 Those ends were not divorced from humanitarian considerations, but neither
 were they dominated by them. The statutory definition of refugee adopted in
 1965, which - with the exception of certain victims "of catastrophic natural
 calamity"-included only those fleeing persecution "from a Communist-
 dominated country or area, or from any country within the general area of the
 Middle East,"' reflected a cold war policy choice that directed the nation's
 JOHN A. SCANLAN is assistant director of the Center for Civil and Human Rights at the Notre
 Dame Law School. G.D. LOESCHER, assistant professor in the Department of Government and
 International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, is coeditor of Human Rights and American
 Foreign Policy. Both served as consultants to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
 Policy and are currently at work on a book about the history of American refugee admissions policy,
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 generosity toward the victims of many, but certainly not all, of the most severe
 refugee-producing situations of the last thirty years. Of the millions of African
 refugees displaced by intertribal terrorism, famine, and war since 1960, only a
 few thousand ever reached the United States. No equivalent to the "open arms"
 extended to Cubans fleeing Castro from 1961 to April 1980 was ever extended to
 Chileans fleeing Pinochet, Haitians fleeing Duvalier, or those fleeing the current
 bloodshed in El Salvador. The admission of some 400,000 displaced persons
 from post-World War II Europe, 35,000 Hungarians from Austria in
 1957-1958, and nearly 500,000 Indochinese from Thailand, Malaysia, and the
 Philippines from 1975 to 1980 had as a common theme American concern over
 the destabilizing effect of large refugee populations in parts of the world deemed
 vital for national security. The admission of over 800,000 Cubans from 1961
 to 1 April 1980 and of 50,000 Soviet Jews from 1973 to the present was
 predicated not only on the existence of political persecution abroad and on the
 presence of vocal pressure groups in the United States, but also on continuing
 anti-Communist sentiment in the foreign-policy community and a continued in-
 terest in seeing those opposed to communism "vote with their feet."
 Nothing the Reagan administration has done or said suggests any dissatisfac-
 tion with these traditional ends of American refugee admissions policy. Yet two
 events in the spring of 1980 affecting the flow of refugees into the United States,
 and the nation's ability to control that flow, have substantially altered the con-
 text in which admissions decisions must be made. The first of these events was
 the passage of a new Refugee Act in March; the second was the beginning of a
 mass asylum crisis in April, when the Cuban "freedom flotilla" began.
 Together, they have created practical and political difficulties that cannot be
 resolved unless the nation turns more of its attention to the refugee problem in
 this hemisphere, responds to that problem in a manner that places predominant
 emphasis on human rights rather than on ideology, and enlists more multilateral
 and bilateral cooperation in an attempt both to minimize the number of
 refugees and more equitably resettle those who cannot be repatriated.
 THE EFFECT OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
 The new Refugee Act incorporates into domestic law for the first time a defini-
 tion that is not ideologically or geographically limited. Under the new law, any
 person from any part of the world is eligible for refugee status, provided that he
 or she can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
 ion."2 The new law, of course, is subject to different interpretations: "Merely
 because an individual or group of refugees comes within the definition will not
 guarantee resettlement in the United States. . . . the new definition does not
 create a new and expanded means of entry, but instead regularizes and for-
 2 Section 201(a), Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 101, adding 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1 101(a)(42), I.N.A. Sec.
 I01(a)(42).
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 malizes the policies and the practices that have been followed in recent years."3
 For individuals outside of the United States seeking refuge, this analysis of the
 law is substantially correct. For those reaching the borders of the United States
 before seeking refuge, however, the new definition does appear to provide "a
 new and expanded means of entry." The new Refugee Act affords protection for
 the first time to many fleeing right-wing repression in this hemisphere and ex-
 pands upon the protections traditionally afforded to refugees seeking
 withholding of deportation.4 The effect of these changes is to prevent the
 United States from expelling or returning any alien who, having reached the
 United States, can demonstrate he or she fits within the new refugee definition.
 When Congress passed the new Refugee Act, it apparently believed that no
 more than 5,000 aliens per year would enter the United States with potentially
 valid asylum claims. Given the fact that nearly 20,000 such claims were pending
 in November, 1979, and that at least as many potential claims were being ad-
 ministratively bypassed at the time the Refugee Act was enacted, such an
 estimate may have been overly optimistic.5 At any rate, it became quickly in-
 operative in April 1980 when the first wave of the "freedom flotilla," eventually
 bringing 130,000 Cubans to Florida in a five-month period, hit American
 shores. By the end of 1980, these Cubans had been joined by over 11,000 Hai-
 tian "boat people" and by an indeterminate number of Ethiopians,
 Nicaraguans, Iranians, and Salvadorans seeking political asylum. Perhaps
 150,000 to 160,000 aliens entered the United States in 1980 with potential
 asylum claims.
 The bureaucracies charged with regulating refugee flow were overwhelmed by
 this massive influx. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) lacked
 the personnel to interview expeditiously each person seeking asylum, much less
 to evaluate each applicant's claim properly. The Department of State, charged
 with issuing an "advisory opinion" as to the probable good faith of each appli-
 cant's "well-founded fear," was even more understaffed.6 The Carter ad-
 ministration therefore sidestepped the question of which applicants would be
 granted asylum by creating on 20 June 1980 the temporary status of
 I U.S., Congress, House, Judiciary Committee, H.R. Report no. 608, 96th Cong., 1st sess.,
 November 1979, p. 10.
 4 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h), I.N.A. Sec. 243(h) has been amended to make such withholding man-
 datory when probable persecution exists. "Excludable aliens," who make up a significant percentage
 of those seeking asylum, are now also protected by this statutory provision.
 I Figures on pending asylum claims were obtained from internal INS memoranda that were not
 available when the new Refugee Act was first reported in 1979. In 1978 and 1979, INS avoided pro-
 cessing most Nicaraguan and Ethiopian asylum claims by granting applicants "extended voluntary
 departure," thereby permitting continued short-term residence without the immediate threat of
 deportation. A similar strategy was employed in 1979 and 1980 for Iranians, even though President
 Carter had proscribed granting them formal "extended voluntary departure" status.
 6 During the height of the Cuban influx, only one State Department officer was assigned full time
 to handling asylum claims. By August 1980, this number had risen to three. Interviews conducted
 with State Department and INS officials by G.D. Loescher and John A. Scanlan, 18-19 May and
 12-13 August 1980.
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 "Cuban/Haitian entrant." Meanwhile, potential asylum-seekers continued to
 flow into the United States in unprecedented numbers, creating immense dif-
 ficulties in local host communities and generating a significant backlash in the
 public and in the press. On the whole, this surge of asylum-seekers into the
 United States and the governmental and nongovernmental response to that
 surge constituted the mass asylum crisis of 1980, the second and most important
 event challenging the traditional, ideological basis of American refugee admis-
 sions policy.
 MASS ASYLUM: A CHRONIC INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
 Brought about because of a large-scale refugee flow not contemplated or ad-
 dressed by the new Refugee Act, the mass asylum crisis of 1980 has raised fun-
 damental questions about the ability of the United States to regulate the flow of
 refugees to its borders and about the principles that should govern the
 regulatory power it does possess. Much of that concern to date has centered on
 domestic factors, such as those limiting the ability of the government to effec-
 tively screen refugees before they enter the mainstream of American society and
 those contributing to backlash after the refugees are resettled. The Carter-
 appointed Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, in its Final
 Report to the Congress and the President, made a number of recommendations
 that, if adopted, should streamline the processing of massive numbers of asylum
 claims, aid in the resettlement of those granted asylum, and marginally reduce
 the number of individuals entering the United States with the hope of remaining
 indefinitely by dragging out patently nonmeritorious claims.7
 A more aggressive approach has been taken by the Reagan administration to
 discourage the flow of refugees seeking asylum. Among the steps already taken
 have been the stopping of Haitian vessels at sea by the United States Coast
 Guard and the delivery of their passengers to the Haitian government; the
 establishment of remote and harsh detention camps for asylum applicants
 designed to discourage entry and encourage "voluntary" deportation; a new
 "hard line" toward Cuba; and the introduction of several restrictive immigration
 bills in Congress.8 Yet, there is little consensus among legal scholars, legislators,
 and immigration authorities about what legal changes can or should be made,
 and the problems posed by "mass asylum" clearly defy simplistic legal solutions.
 Aggressive punitive measures directed at asylum-seekers may retard their influx,
 but will not stem it so long as the underlying reasons for that flow remain intact.
 The United States, with the highest standard of living in the Western
 Hemisphere and a tradition of political freedom, will draw many aliens to its
 I See Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the
 National Interest (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 165-76.
 8 As of 15 November 1981, bills had been introduced or proposed in the Senate that would strip
 asylum-seekers of many of their due-process rights and make them subject to interdiction at sea in
 violation of customary rules of international law; change the current refugee definition; and put an
 overall "cap" on immigration that would effectively limit refugee flow.
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 borders. Determining which are bona fide refugees is an absolutely essential
 domestic enterprise; yet to the extent that such a determination is made after
 asylum applicants have reached the United States, and particularly after they
 have reached the United States in large numbers, it is of limited value. The dif-
 ficulties the nation faces in returning Cuban criminals to Cuba, or in finding
 any other country willing to take them, are illustrative of the problems that en-
 sue, as is the long history of American efforts to exclude or deport Haitians not
 deemed refugees by the INS or by the Department of State. These difficulties
 are significantly increased whenever an asylum applicant comes from a country
 where segments of the population suffer severe economic deprivation as a result
 of governmental policy. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to determine if
 the government's conduct constitutes a form of "persecution" and, thus, to
 determine if those entering the United States are "political refugees" or
 "economic migrants." Although this problem is acute in evaluating the claims of
 many migrants from the Caribbean basin, it is not due simply to the permissive
 language of the Refugee Act of 1980. Since 1948, the great majority of
 "refugees" who have been welcomed to the United States, whether from
 Western Europe, Vietnam, or Cuba, have entered with mixed political and
 economic motives. Since 1968, the United States has been obligated by interna-
 tional treaty to determine, on an individual basis, whether particular applicants
 are in danger of persecution and whether they can be legally returned to their
 country of origin.9
 As long as large numbers of undocumented aliens enter the United States with
 such mixed motives, the government-as recent class-action suits involving
 Cubans, Haitians, and Salvadorans illustrate'0-will find it difficult to sum-
 marily turn them away. Yet the current political climate of the region, as well as
 the standards of conduct of foreign governments that the United States often
 tacitly supports, makes such large numbers inevitable. The arrival of perhaps
 160,000 of these aliens in the United States at the country's borders in 1980 was
 unprecedented; yet it can be reasonably expected that somewhat smaller, but
 still very large, numbers of such applicants will arrive in the United States in
 1981 and the years following.
 The basis for such an expectation is both historical and political. Although
 most refugees have traditionally entered the United States after being processed
 abroad, since at least 1965, when "freedom flights" from Cuba were preceded by
 the arrival of some 2,500 Cubans in boats, some have arrived each year as
 asylum-seekers. And an increasingly large number have entered the United
 States illegally from countries in Central America or the Caribbean. An
 9 Article 33, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, incorporated by 1967 Protocol
 Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577(1968).
 '0 See, for example, Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, no. C81-1084A (Northern District, Ga.) (20
 August 1981) (Cuban internees held in federal prisons ordered released); Haitian Refugee Center v.
 Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (Southern District, Fla., 1980) (Haitian deportation orders set aside). A
 campaign has recently been initiated by several public-interest law groups to bring similar actions on
 behalf of Salvadorans detained in the Southwest.
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 estimated 25,000 Nicaraguans, for instance, were in the United States just prior
 to the fall of the Somoza regime; and 30,000 Haitians have entered the United
 States by boat in the last fifteen years, with the 1980 flow triple that of any prior
 year. Recent news accounts indicate that perhaps 70,000 Salvadorans have
 entered the United States since the beginning of 1980, many by crossing the
 Mexican border. It is quite possible that in the near future the United States will
 experience some new flows from Cuba and Nicaragua, sudden movements of
 large numbers of people from Jamaica and Guatemala, and greatly increased
 numbers of Haitians, both from Haiti and from the Bahamas, where officials
 have recently attempted to repatriate many of the Haitians living there
 (although the Duvalier regime has been uncooperative). Increasing political ten-
 sion in the region is not likely to abate soon, and unless peaceful changes in the
 relationship between the landed and the unlanded classes are initiated or carried
 further, that tension, on a country-by-country basis, is likely to explode into
 violence and to lead to overt persecution of all political opposition. Others,
 threatened by the strife, although not themselves political targets, will also flee.
 While any prediction is speculative, the potential thus appears to exist for an an-
 nual flow of perhaps 50,000 asylum applicants to the United States, with larger
 numbers arriving in years of heightened conflict.
 A HARD LOOK AT THE "HARD LINE"
 The Reagan administration has not yet fully developed its response to events in
 this hemisphere that have the potential to affect refugee flow. Yet a "hard line"
 with the following characteristics appears to be emerging: confrontation, rather
 than negotiation, with Cuba; identification of all left-wing revolutionary trends
 in the region with the policies and goals of Cuba and the Soviet Union, rather
 than with such local concerns as land reform; extension of broad support, in-
 cluding stepped-up military aid, to regimes, such as those in El Salvador, Chile,
 and Argentina, attempting to stamp out "leftists"; isolation and destabilization
 of regimes, such as the one in Nicaragua, that have supported "leftists" in other
 countries; deemphasis of concerns about human-rights violations by regimes in
 power in favor of opposition to revolutionary "terrorism"; resumption of the
 deportation of Haitian asylum applicants illegally in the United States; interdic-
 tion by force of vessels carrying undocumented aliens to the United States;
 detention of asylum applicants pending resolutions of their claims; and con-
 tinuation of a refusal to grant either asylum or "extended voluntary
 departure"-a temporary expedient used by President Carter for Nicaraguans
 during 1978 and 1979-to applicants from El Salvador. The primary emphasis
 of this emerging policy is ideological, reflecting viewpoints similar to those that
 were used to justify both the U.S. military intervention in the Dominican
 Republic in 1965 and the U.S.-supported attempt to destabilize the Allende
 regime in Chile in 1971. This hard-line policy will have relatively short-term,
 direct effects on refugee flow into the United States and the potential for in-
 directly affecting the volume and nature of that flow well into the future.
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 The short-term effects will derive, in large part, from the Cuban government's
 response to the United States's more belligerent attitude toward it and from ef-
 forts of the INS to repatriate Haitians and exclude Salvadorans. In all probabili-
 ty, the flow of refugees from nations in the Western Hemisphere into the United
 States will be reduced quite substantially. At least three-quarters of all potential
 asylum-seekers entering the United States in 1980 were Cubans, many of whom
 had political reasons for leaving. Yet the large-scale sea migration could not
 have occurred without the Castro regime's active intervention, and clearly was
 manipulated for that regime's own political ends. As a result, the regime was
 able both to profiteer and to export some undesirable Cubans who had spent
 time in criminal or mental institutions and who did not meet any of the criteria
 of the current definition of refugee.
 The Reagan administration has reportedly admonished Castro not to unleash
 another exodus of boat people to Florida and has demanded a commitment
 from Havana to take back hundreds of the undesirable Cubans who emigrated
 to the United States during 1980. " In its attempt to curb Cuban activities in the
 hemisphere, including the provision of military aid to the insurgents in El
 Salvador, the United States has threatened Cuba with a variety of reprisals, in-
 cluding possible military action or a naval quarantine. To date, this tough
 stance seems to have prevented any repetition of last year's orchestrated exodus.
 In marked contrast to its activities surrounding the 1980 occupation of the Peru-
 vian embassy when the Cuban government granted almost unlimited access to
 embassy grounds and took no active steps to expel Cuban nationals, the Cuban
 government acted swiftly in February 1981 to evict aliens attempting to obtain
 asylum on the Ecuadoran embassy grounds. Nor was there any repetition in
 1981 of the wide-spread granting of exit visas that characterized the 1980
 episode.
 The current treatment of Salvadorans and Haitians may discourage some of
 their friends or relatives from seeking to enter the United States. For potential
 refugees from El Salvador, the prospects appear to be for a greater, rather than
 a lesser, flow from that country, since Salvadoran refugees need only cross in-
 adequately patrolled land borders to enter the United States. The number of
 persons displaced by fighting in El Salvador or targeted for extermination by
 right- and left-wing death squads has grown rapidly in the last year. U.S.
 pressure against Cuba and Nicaragua may decrease the flow of arms to left-wing
 insurgents; yet additional U.S. military aid specifically designed to help the
 present government to extend its control over the rugged countryside is certain
 to produce more refugees.
 The volume of Haitian refugees seeking asylum in the United States is also
 likely to rise steadily. Since the summer of 1980, the situation in Haiti has
 worsened: Hurricane Allen further impoverished the poorest country in the
 hemisphere; the government's crackdown on the press and imprisonment of
 I Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Reagan Chooses Caribbean as Target Area," Washington
 Post, 25 February 1981.
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 human-rights activists in late 1980 demonstrated again how deep the disregard
 for human rights is in Haiti; and the government's unwillingness to repatriate
 any of its nationals illegally in the Bahamas left some thirty thousand unwanted
 Haitians with no place to go. By establishing its detention program and enlisting
 the diplomatic support of the Haitian government in the interdiction of vessels
 containing Haitians, the Reagan administration has sought to counterbalance
 these increased migration pressures. The impact of these measures will not be
 determined until the spring and summer of 1982, when the weather will be most
 favorable for the traffic of small boats. Yet it is already clear that successful
 legal attacks on portions of the detention program have undercut the ad-
 ministration's ability to regulate the flow. The Coast Guard's presence off the
 coast of Haiti is minimal and is not likely to increase. Equally important, the
 government of Haiti has nothing to gain from cooperating enthusiastically in
 the repatriation of its dissidents and its poor, and the United States, given its un-
 willingness to undercut its allies in the ideological struggle against the
 "totalitarian" left, lacks a credible "tough" response to force such cooperation.
 Even if the United States currently possessed the means to exclude Haitian or
 Salvadoran refugees as effectively as it may be able to exclude Cubans, it is
 doubtful in the long run whether such exclusion either could be maintained or
 would prove beneficial. Barriers to entry will be only partially effective, par-
 ticularly along the porous Mexican border, and the cost of a gunboat diplomacy
 to keep that flow away from U.S. shores may be prohibitive, not only in dollars
 and cents, but also in terms of maintaining good relationships with other
 "receiver" or "conduit" nations and of upholding the country's international
 reputation generally.'2 Under these circumstances, pressures to limit the entry
 of refugees will always be competing with, and sometimes be outweighed by, in-
 ternational pressures. Such pressure will frequently be intensified by strongly
 voiced domestic sentiment for the admission of particular groups of refugees
 who appeal to the humanitarian or ethnic sensibilities of certain segments of the
 U.S. population.
 For these reasons, unless the U.S. government addresses refugee-producing
 situations directly, it will grow increasingly difficult to exclude asylum-seekers,
 not only those coming from El Salvador and Haiti, but also from other coun-
 tries in the region. It is probable that among these asylum-seekers will be a
 substantial number of Cubans. Current governmental responses to the Castro
 regime may have stemmed the tide, but cannot be expected to hold it back in-
 definitely. It is hardly accidental that the United States resettled over 900,000
 Cubans in the first twenty years of Castro's rule. Geographical proximity, a
 12 According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), it would require "an increase of $125
 million in the [INS] $250 million annual operating costs" to obtain the personnel, fencing,
 helicopters, and so forth, necessary "to secure about 10 percent of the 2,000-mile Mexican border"
 (Comptroller General of the United States, Prospects Dim for Effectively Enforcing Immigration
 Laws: Report to the Congress of the United States [Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1980], p. iii).
 Moreover, the President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy estimates that an 85 per-
 cent effective interdiction program by the Coast Guard would cost $425 million annually.
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 large and vocal Cuban community in the United States, periodic economic
 distress in Cuba, and genuine opposition to Castro's brand of communism, both
 here and in Cuba, are all factors promoting refugee flow. The Reagan ad-
 ministration's "hard line" is predicated in part on an antidetente strategy that
 permits rough treatment of the Soviet Union's client state and in part on a
 perception of regional politics that believes the United States can take a strong
 stance on Cuba without endangering relationships with countries in the
 hemisphere who have been traditional allies. Global political considerations
 may require another East-West "thaw," or otherwise militate against making
 Cuba a confrontation point with the Soviet Union. State Department personnel
 have already voiced concern that the current administration's anti-Castro cam-
 paign may backfire by provoking another mass exodus, which the United States
 will be powerless to prevent.'3 If recent Mexican and Venezuelan responses to
 current U.S. Cuban policy are at all indicative of relationships between the
 United States and other countries in the hemisphere, then strong regional
 reasons already exist for the United States to modify its stance. Thus, global and
 regional factors may well combine to deprive the United States of much of the
 leverage it has against Castro and force it to seek other methods of limiting
 refugee flow.
 HUMAN RIGHTS AND AN EFFECTIVE ADMISSIONS POLICY
 In the long run the only effective way of reducing the flow of refugees to the
 United States from countries in this hemisphere is to address concretely the con-
 ditions that create refugees. To do so the United States will have to maintain a
 foreign policy that raises the issue of persecution abroad, provides the means to
 at least partially reduce the political and economic tensions that lead to such
 persecution, and takes concrete nonmilitary action against those nations that
 persist in persecuting their own citizens.
 To date, the Reagan administration's approach to persecution abroad has not
 deterred refugee flow to the United States. President Reagan and Secretary of
 State Alexander Haig have given priority to strengthening the United States's
 resolve and resources to defend allies the administration considers threatened by
 totalitarian aggression or subversion. The White House has expressed its belief
 that by exercising U.S. power, deterring war, and preventing the expansion of
 Communist rule, they are protecting such basic international human rights as
 freedom from foreign domination, internal security, and the freedom of person.
 The administration's relationship with the governments of Guatemala, Haiti,
 Argentina, and Chile in this hemisphere, as well as with the governments of
 South Korea and the Philippines, falls within this framework. Aid to such
 regimes, including the provision of weapons that can be used against domestic
 dissidents, is regarded as good public policy. For this reason, President Reagan
 II Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Dissent on Radio Plan," New York Times, 29 Oc-
 tober 1981.
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 fought - unsuccessfully - to prevent any tie-in between the human-rights situa-
 tion in El Salvador and U.S. military assistance.'4 A recent memorandum by
 former Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and approved by Secretary
 Haig commits the administration to "acknowledg[ing]" and "oppos[ing]" all
 violations of human rights, whether perpetuated by friends or by foes. '5 Yet the
 administration has not, to date at least, taken concrete action in support of such
 a commitment. And as military governments get the message that the
 democratization process supported by the Carter administration can slow down,
 it seems certain that refugee flow to the United States will increase.
 It is necessary, therefore, that the United States develop bilateral and
 multilateral arrangements that better address and alleviate the conditions that
 create refugees. In particular, the United States should pursue a set of foreign-
 policy objectives designed, first, to open lines of communication with sender na-
 tions; second, to discourage the practice of persecution in these nations; and
 third, to convince these nations that it is not in their best interest internationally
 to expel undesirables and political opponents, including those who are not gen-
 uine refugees.
 Bilateral Diplomacy
 Without direct and continuous communication, the means of influencing coun-
 tries in this hemisphere to stop either persecuting dissidents or expelling
 undesirables, or both, is decidedly limited. It seemed an article of faith of the
 Carter administration that the United States was "stuck" with all of the recent
 boat people from Cuba, nonrefugees as well as refugees, because Castro was
 totally unwilling to take any of them back. As things stand at present, such a
 belief is probably justified. Yet the United States's attempts to isolate Cuba
 diplomatically and economically over the last twenty years have certainly been
 major factors contributing to America's current limited diplomatic leverage
 with Castro. By pursuing a policy favoring confrontation rather than com-
 promise, the United States has encouraged unilateral activity on Castro's part,
 some of which reflects long-standing political antagonisms. Adverse effects of
 this activity in the United States frequently have been compounded because the
 closing of direct diplomatic channels has had as one of its results the denial of
 intelligence information to American planners. The recent Cuban migration was
 unexpected; if further migration occurs, its magnitude is likely to remain a
 mystery until the last boat docks.
 Full and adequate diplomatic relations with Cuba are likely to provide a
 firmer and more satisfactory basis for reaching an accommodation with the
 Castro regime than the current hard line ever can. This fact was apparently
 14See "Reagan Plan Rejected: Senate Votes Terms for Salvadoran Aid," Washington Post, 25
 September 1981.
 1' "Excerpts from State Department Memo on Human Rights," New York Times, 5 November
 1981.
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 recognized by the Carter administration, which attempted during its first years
 in office to secure a better diplomatic modus vivendi with the Castro regime
 than had existed since 1959. The failure of that effort, which anticipated by only
 a few months the onset of the 1980 Cuban boatlift, does not detract from the
 importance of the goal. Normalized relationships between the two countries will
 give the United States the opportunity to enter into direct negotiations with
 Cuba concerning the status of Cuban prisoners and mental defectives currently
 confined in American institutions. Such improved relations will also permit the
 United States to explain more clearly its concerns about unregulated refugee
 flow and the conditions that promote it and will have the added advantage of
 providing the kinds of information required to predict problems before they
 become insurmountable. Normalized relations will also provide a better, less in-
 herently threatening way of raising the issue of human-rights violations that
 create refugees than is possible through other vehicles, such as the propaganda
 broadcasts that the Reagan administration currently plans to beam into Cuba.
 Similarly, it must be the goal of the United States government to maintain full
 and adequate diplomatic relationships with every nation in Central America and
 the Caribbean, whatever their political tendencies, since each has the potential
 either to send refugees seeking asylum to the United States or to act as a conduit
 during periods of economic or political upheaval.
 Bilateral and Multilateral Development Assistance
 A point that is too seldom emphasized is the indirect nature of the relationship
 between the level and type of development assistance and the expansion or con-
 traction of refugee flow. For example, money given or lent to Haiti to build
 roads or irrigate farms is not the equivalent of money used to purchase food or
 shelter or medical supplies for those fleeing from persecution in Ethiopia or
 Cambodia. In the latter instance, the expected benefit, although frequently
 substantial, is short term: to give temporary aid to starving, homeless, diseased
 people; if these people are placed in refugee camps, those camps are not self-
 sustaining, and the aid must be constantly renewed. In contrast, the expected
 benefit of development assistance is characteristically long term, and positive
 results may not begin to emerge until long after the money is spent: for example,
 the road in Haiti may remain unused until a cement plant is built at its terminal
 point.
 Associated with the short-term nature of refugee relief are fairly immediate
 indicators of success, which are closely tied to the results of persecution or want.
 Thus, relief aid can be deemed successful if people no longer starve, have a roof
 over their heads, and no longer contract various diseases in large numbers.
 Measuring the success of development assistance is always difficult. It becomes
 even more so when such assistance is linked to policy expectations in the human-
 rights and refugee areas.
 The lack of a direct, general relationship between development assistance and
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 persecution does not mean, however, that all types of assistance are equally like-
 ly to be used for persecution as for nonpersecutive ends. For example, military
 aid, especially programs directed to support police or internal security forces of
 repressive regimes, is liable to be used to suppress dissent. Nonmilitary aid
 directed to traditional holders of power and wealth may "trickle down" to
 farmers and laborers, slowly bettering their standard of living, but actually
 widening the disparity between the living conditions of the rich and the poor. In
 the long run, such aid is likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate the tensions
 between the haves and have-nots, and thus, make persecution more, rather than
 less, likely. Nonmilitary aid directed toward the disadvantaged is likely to of-
 fend traditional elites and thus could trigger repression. Yet in the long run, it is
 only this type of aid that is likely to defuse the explosive mix of privilege and
 poverty endemic in so many countries of the Caribbean and Central America.
 Periodically ignited by political events common to the region, such as the spread
 of Castro's theories of social revolution, or specific to a particular country, such
 as the assassination in January 1978 of Nicaragua's leading opposition
 spokesman, that mix, unless reformulated, will continue to produce refugees
 who are victimized by recurrent waves of repression and thus are anxious to
 come to the United States.
 Development assistance directed toward the poor of the region can therefore
 serve a significant, although indirect, role in eventually reducing refugee flow.
 Yet because the effect of such aid is indirect, and thus may take a number of
 years to unfold fully, such programs as are developed with the objective of
 reducing the flow of refugees should be given ample opportunity to work before
 being curtailed or terminated. Because it is clear that the United States lacks the
 resources to finance sweeping social changes throughout the Caribbean and
 Central America, it should choose its target countries carefully, focusing most
 of its attention on nations that are either already refugee senders or likely to
 become so. U.S. policymakers should also make a special effort to promote
 social reform at the grass-roots level in Haiti and Jamaica, both of which are
 likely to be significant refugee senders in the 1980s.
 For many of the same considerations that warrant the "targeting" of bilateral
 development assistance, the United States should also become more heavily in-
 volved in multilateral development programs than it has in the recent past. The
 Reagan administration's approach to date is highly equivocal. On one hand, it
 has offered increased economic assistance to the government of El Salvador and
 joined in the multilateral North-South dialogue initiated at the Cancun con-
 ference held on 22-23 October 1981. Yet at that conference, Reagan made no
 pledge to a new international aid program, much less to the "New International
 Economic Order" favored by the poorer participating nations. The present ad-
 ministration has also reached an understanding with Mexico and Venezuela to
 cooperate in devising aid programs for the nations of the Western Hemisphere.
 The only aid contemplated by the administration, however, appears to be loan
 guarantees that, among other things, will enable U.S. businesses to expand their
 markets throughout the region.
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 It is through lending agencies such as the World Bank and through regional
 development institutions that the appropriate type and level of aid can best be
 initiated, and the cost and risks associated with such aid best distributed.
 Although these institutions are hardly apolitical, they can be expected to put
 greater emphasis on long-term development goals than on short-term trade ad-
 vantages to the lender. Linking these development goals to current concerns
 about human rights in desperately poor countries such as Haiti, however, is like-
 ly to prove as difficult for international assistance authorities as it is for the
 United States Congress. Clearly, recipient nations must not only meet re-
 quirements for financial accountability, they must also give reasonable
 assurances that this assistance will not be used to strengthen their repressive
 capabilities. Yet properly designed and monitored aid programs can both con-
 tribute very materially to the economic and social well-being of a population
 and substantially strengthen ground-level participatory institutions despite ef-
 forts of a repressive regime to misuse them.
 Bilateral Military Assistance
 Perhaps the most obvious source of bilateral leverage is with regard to U.S.
 military assistance. In general, the United States should seek to dissociate itself
 from repression by denying exports of arms, munitions, and military or police
 equipment to the military or police forces in countries where human rights are
 known to be violated or where the record is questionable. Such sanctions are
 already required by U.S. law; yet such legislation has been applied inconsistent-
 ly, particularly in cases where other U.S. interests such as the regional balance
 of power, U.S. base rights, and continued constructive bilateral relations are
 perceived to be at stake.
 Many of the countries in this hemisphere have a long tradition of military
 rule, sometimes only intermittently replaced by more democratic forms of
 government. Individuals such as Pinochet, Batista, Trujillo, and the Somozas
 have all demonstrated how the military can be turned into an instrument of
 systematic persecution. Thus, military power in all of Latin America, although
 sometimes relatively benign, has the potential to be used, not to counter external
 threats, but to repress internal dissent. The recent spread of terrorism, in some
 instances clearly supported from abroad, has tended to obscure the boundary
 between the two. As recent events in Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala il-
 lustrate, the military reaction to such terrorism, however much it may be
 motivated by fears of Marxist revolution, can seriously and systematically
 undermine political and other human rights and help create large numbers of
 potential refugees.
 Military dictatorships will continue to seize power in Latin America and they
 will continue to exercise that power according to their own political views
 whether or not the United States provides military assistance. Yet the scope of
 that power, and the regimes' ability to use it directly against domestic dissidents,
 will often depend on the amount and nature of U.S. military assistance being
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 received. In general, U.S. programs that support police or internal security
 forces of repressive regimes contribute to the capacity of-and serve to
 legitimize the efforts of-those regimes to control and suppress dissent. Despite
 recent efforts made by the Congress to curb U.S. military assistance to
 repressive regimes, undemocratic leaders such as Anastasio Somoza of
 Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran were able to purchase unlimited quantities of
 gas masks, gas riot grenades, and riot control munitions through the U.S. Com-
 mercial Sales program to maintain power and repress political dissent right up
 to the closing days of their rule. It was not lack of weapons, but rather internal
 discord and disregard of basic rights, that brought about the downfall of both
 men.
 Renewed U.S. concern with what it perceives as traditional threats to its na-
 tional security may create a political environment in Latin America in which
 human rights and anticommunism are seen as synonymous. To regard events in
 Central America and the Caribbean primarily in terms of minimizing Soviet and
 Cuban influence is to pay little heed to local political factors and to look upon
 conflicts in the Third World as abstract units in a global contest for military
 power. Such an approach to regional problems presages a return to the position
 the United States took during the post-World War II years when, in the name of
 the unity of the "free world," successive American administrations recruited and
 embraced regimes of the authoritarian right in the effort to contain the
 totalitarian left.
 Military support for repressive and unpopular regimes is bad foreign policy
 because such regimes cannot stand on their own when internal and external
 pressures mount. Such regimes almost inevitably produce large numbers of
 refugees. It is important, therefore, that U.S. assistance not directly or indirect-
 ly strengthen the repressive capabilities of the governments of Latin America.
 Future proposals for transfers of military and security items should be scruti-
 nized with great care to determine if their use would contribute to the repressive
 functions of official or unofficial internal security forces.
 Multilateral Pressures on Sender Nations
 More cooperation among nations receiving refugees, through new multilateral
 arrangements or through existing regional and world organizations, is both
 possible and advisable. Yet a key element of an effective asylum policy must be
 the recognition that there is no magical "international" solution to the problem
 of uncontrolled refugee flow. Areas in which international cooperation is likely
 to prove most effective include the creation, funding, and implementation of
 development assistance programs and the exertion of concerted pressure on
 countries that are expelling their undesirables or persecuting their citizenry. It is
 unlikely, however, that other nations or international agencies could play a
 significant role in helping to screen and resettle refugees and other asylum ap-
 plicants seeking admission to the United States. Nonetheless, national govern-
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 ments and international agencies should actively explore ways to effect better
 arrangements for channeling and distributing the future flow of refugees.
 The United Nations meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons, held in
 Geneva on 20-22 July 1979, provides a valuable example of the possibili-
 ties-and pitfalls-of international attempts to influence the behavior of send-
 ing nations. The primary topic addressed at that meeting concerned the prob-
 lems posed by the massive outflow of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and
 Laos into neighboring countries. The sixty-five countries in attendance pledged
 resettlement aid totaling some $160 million, and several governments increased
 their resettlement commitments, raising the total number of placements from
 125,000 to 260,000. Conference members also planned a new processing center
 in the Philippines and pledged international cooperation in effecting sea
 rescues.
 The attending nations also gave a "general endorsement" to the principles of
 asylum and non-refoulement (forcible return) set forth in the 1951 Convention
 Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
 Refugees, and the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, apparently to em-
 phasize their concern about threats to turn refugee boats back to their country
 of origin and the manner by which the Thai government summarily repatriated
 some 50,000 Cambodians. Conference members more than offset this weak
 concern for the rights of refugees to leave their country of origin, however, by
 expressing a strong desire to reduce refugee flow, a desire that resulted in an an-
 nouncement that Vietnam "for a reasonable period of time. . . will make every
 effort to stop illegal departures."1'6 That announcement contained neither a
 general condemnation of Vietnamese persecution of ethnic Chinese nor a
 reassertion of the principles of Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of
 Human Rights, which ensures freedom of travel. Therefore, although signifi-
 cant positive steps were taken to alleviate the plight of existing refugees, the
 final results of the 1979 Geneva meeting were, at best, mixed. Practical control
 of a difficult situation was obtained only by undercutting the basic
 philosophical commitment of the United Nations to guarantee to peoples facing
 persecution the freedom to move out of danger.
 There are obvious parallels between recent events in this hemisphere and
 those that prompted the Geneva meeting: the large-scale movements of refugees
 by land and sea into neighboring territories; the consequent use of force to in-
 tercept emigrant vessels; the detention of asylum-seekers in harsh holding
 camps; and the summary repatriation of the refugees to their homelands with
 only a minimum of due process. Clearly, the time has come to reassert the prin-
 ciples of asylum and non-refoulement. In addition, the recent expulsion of large
 16 "Statement of the Secretary General at the Opening of Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Per-
 sons," United Nations Press Release, Department of Public Information, 20 July 1979, cited in
 "Refugees-United Nations Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia, July
 20-21, 1979," Harvard International Law Journal 21 (Winter 1980):292.
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 numbers of Cuban undesirables to the United States bears an uncanny
 resemblance to the conduct of the Vietnamese toward ethnic Chinese. Thus,
 there is strong justification for a coordinated effort among nations of the
 Western Hemisphere to bring concerted regional pressure against Castro in
 order to avoid such conduct in the future.
 Yet a conference on refugees and displaced persons can do a great deal of
 harm if those in attendance avoid the difficult issue of human-rights violations
 in the country of origin and choose to approach the refugee problem, not by
 seeking to minimize persecution, but by diligently finding more efficient ways to
 cut off avenues of escape. Any international attempt to control the expulsion of
 undesirables by a country should keep two principles firmly in mind: "orderly
 departure" is a permissible goal, but ought not be confused with denying all
 egress to those who are in fact refugees; and it is essential to determine which in-
 dividuals being expelled are in fact refugees and which are common criminals,
 or are mentally impaired, or are otherwise social misfits.
 Multilateral Refugee Aid and Resettlement
 In order to deal adequately with increased refugee flow in this hemisphere, it is
 essential that multilateral aid be made available to other countries in the region
 that serve as countries of first asylum and, in many instances, as conduits to the
 United States. Failure to provide aid to the thousands of Salvadorans and
 Guatemalans streaming across Mexico's southern border will encourage addi-
 tional migration farther north. Although neither the Bahamas nor the United
 States, except perhaps in the most extraordinary circumstances, is currently will-
 ing to regard Haitians as refugees, it appears that many of those now fleeing
 Haiti could fall within the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High
 Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Consideration should be given to the
 establishment of an international refugee aid program in the Bahamas. Such a
 program could pave the way for a more humanitarian evaluation of the Haitian
 situation in the financially overburdened Bahamas and could ultimately slow
 the flow of refugees to the United States.
 To the fullest extent possible, efforts should also be made to share the burden
 of resettling refugees, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere. The recent
 record, however, is not very encouraging. When some 10,000 Cubans occupied
 the Peruvian embassy grounds in April 1980, efforts were made to resettle them.
 The plan initially had called for nearly all the refugees to go to Costa Rica, but
 before the airlift to Costa Rica ceased to function, the United States promised to
 take in 3,500 Cubans; Peru said it would accept 1,000; and Costa Rica, Spain,
 Ecuador, Argentina, Canada, and Belgium offered homes to another 1,750; this
 left several thousand Cubans with no place to go.
 The subsequent mass migration of Cubans, beginning in April of 1980, had as
 its exclusive object resettlement in the United States. Migration of Haitian boat
 people to the United States began in the 1960s and has periodically increased in
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 volume. Unlike recent Cuban migration, however, the movement of Haitians to
 the United States as potential asylum-seekers has been part of a larger migration
 that has long-standing economic origins and that has sent sizable numbers of
 Haitians to various countries in the Caribbean and North America. Thus,
 although the opportunities for legal emigration are limited, hundreds of
 thousands of Haitians have left Haiti, often without any documentation, to seek
 work in the Bahamas, Canada, and the United States. Perhaps a million others
 have crossed the land border into the Dominican Republic to seek employment.
 The actual Haitian migration to the United States is undoubtedly much greater
 than that involving the boat people arriving in southern Florida. Yet it is only a
 small portion of the actual migration of Haitians generally, and its volume
 depends heavily on the Haitian refugees reception in other countries. Thus,
 whenever the Bahamian government has threatened to "crack down" on its il-
 legal Haitian population and has begun repatriating Haitians, Haitian boat peo-
 ple have arrived in the United States in much greater numbers.
 These migration patterns have significance well beyond their historical in-
 terest. Although a substantial number of Cubans fled to Spain and Mexico dur-
 ing the early years of the Castro era, the United States, only ninety miles
 away-and with its massive Cuban community in Miami, its former colonial
 ties, and its twenty-year history of receiving refugees - has become, in the
 region's eyes, the most natural recipient of Cuban refugees. The recent un-
 manageable level of Cuban flow gave the United States good reason to seek in-
 ternational assistance, but it did not give other countries in the region good
 reason to assume a larger share of refugee resettlement responsibilities. Future
 large-scale migration of Haitians, should it occur, stands on a somewhat dif-
 ferent footing. The United States will have stronger grounds for insisting on a
 more equitable sharing of resettlement responsibilities among countries with
 geographical, historical, and linguistic ties to Haiti. Similarly, arguments for
 shared responsibilities will be stronger when dealing with applicants from other
 countries in the region who have identifiable ties to countries other than the
 United States.
 Steps should be taken now, however, before the next refugee crisis begins, to
 determine the depth of commitment that particular countries in the region have
 to their neighbors. To the fullest degree possible such commitments should be
 intensified by bringing other countries into the planning and implementation of
 development assistance programs targeted on probable sender nations and by
 developing aid programs specifically keyed to the problems of other receiver na-
 tions. Steps should also be taken now to establish a program for screening
 refugee applicants either in their country of origin or in some other locality not
 likely to be chosen as a country of final asylum. In this way, it will be possible to
 distribute refugees among various countries according to some mutually
 agreeable plan without necessitating overly extensive involvement by chosen
 countries of final asylum.
 Even if a means of processing refugees in their country of origin, or at some
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 third-country holding center, is developed, it is unlikely that the individual
 countries receiving applications will choose to surrender their power to deter-
 mine the bona fides of particular claims to a collective body. This is not to say
 that actual processing may not be affected by decisions reached through
 multilateral negotiations or that UNHCR determinations may not be afforded
 great weight. Actual screening by the United States may well prove to be a for-
 mality in many cases. Yet the same political considerations that favor recom-
 mending that new U.S. asylum procedures give the UNHCR only an observor's
 role-namely, that domestic sentiment appears strongly to favor the
 maintenance of direct governmental control of refugee admissions -apply with
 even greater force to out-of-country applicants.
 Control of applicants for mass asylum will continue to pose difficult political
 and moral choices for the United States. These difficult choices are not going to
 disappear soon, but they can be alleviated somewhat if the nation pursues a
 vigorous foreign policy designed to minimize persecution abroad, particularly in
 the Western Hemisphere. The primary focus must be on the reduction of
 refugee flow by eliminating "well-founded fear," rather than on an orchestrated
 international blindness to those facing imprisonment, torture, or death simply
 because they belong to the wrong profession or because they happen to express
 contrary political views.
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